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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides a historical background and current 
status of United States/Japan defense responsibility sharing. 
It is not an attempt to determine whether Japan is 
contributing her "fair share" to the common defense or 
enjoying a "free ri.de.!! 
This thesis examines the following financial issues: (1) 
With reduced Department of Defense appropriated fund support 
and no reduction in the Japan-related mission and/or support 
requirements, can the United States look to the Government of 
Japan (GOJ) to reduce the cost of this commitment?; (2) What 
is the curren t  status of the United States/Japan responsibil- 
ity sharing? What activities does the GOJ currently support?; 
(3) What changes may be anticipated in Japanese contributions 
to support United States forces?: (4) What changes may be 
expected in the next ten to 15 years in United States/Japan 
responsibility sharing, particularly in view of actual and 
pot.entia1 United States force structure reductions? 
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A security relationship between the United States and its 
Pacific Allies, similar to the type that exists between the 
United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) is not possible for  a variety of reasons 
including the diversity of cultures, political systems, and 
levels of economic development in the Pacific region. As a 
consequence, bilateral arrangements between the United States 
and Asian allies with forward deployed United States forces 
and the maintenance of overseas base infrastructures have 
become the basic tenent of United States military strategy. 
In a recent statement before tne Senate Armed Services 
Committee, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said, 
Our most important bilateral relationship in Asia is with 
Japan. Not only is this relationship of tremendous economic 
and political importance, but it is also in Japan where we 
have the most forward deployed military forces in the 
region. We believe that we must maintain a substantial pre- 
sence in Japan, for two reasons: One, the geostrategic lo- 
cation of these bases and two, the cost effectiveness of our 
presence compared to anywhere else. (Wolfowitz, 1990, p.  
1 4  
A changing global political environment, improved 
relations with the Soviet Union, improved economic conditions 
and growing military capability of many Asian allies present 
the opportunity for the United States to review and adjust 
sharing of Pacific area defense costs and responsibilities. 
This thesis explores the United States/Japanese alliance in 
1 
terms of past and current contributians to responsibility 
sharing. It also analyzes prospects f o r  future defense 
contributions from Japan in support of United States Pacific 
forces. 
Specifically this thesis examines the following financial 
issues: 
As the Department of Defense faces reduced appropriated 
fund support with no reduction in the Japan-related 
mission and/or support requirements, can the United 
States look to the Government of Japan (GOJ) to reduce 
the cost of this commitment? 
What is the current status of United States/Japan 
responsibility sharing? What activities does the GOJ 
currently support? 
What changes may be anticipated in Japanese contribu- 
tions to support United States forces? 
what changes may be expected in the next ten to 15 
years in United States/Japan responsibility sharing, 
particularly in view of actual and potential United 
States force structure seductions? 
This thesis provides a historical background and current 
status of U.s.jJapan defense responsibility sharing. It is 
not an attempt to determine whether Japan is contributing her 
I I E a i r  sharewt to the common defense or enjoying a l'free ride." 
For purposes of research, this thesis is divided into the 
following five areas of responsibility sharing: Japanese 
Facilities Improvement Program; Labor Cost Sharing: Relocation 
Construction Program; Base Countermeasures and Cost of Private 
It Land: and Foregone Revenues and Other Compensation. 
presents an insight into the background of these five areas 
and analyzes factors that have led the United States and Japan 
2 
to the present responsibility sharing status. The thesis 
concludes with my personal. view into the future. 
Research for this thesis was conducted by interviews with 
personnel involved with the budgeting, planning, and reporting 
of the five areas at Headquarters, United States Forces Japan, 
Yokota, Japan; Headquarters, United States Naval Forces Japan, 
Yokosuka, Japan; Headquarters, Commander in Chief, Pacific, 
Honolulu, Hawaii: Headquarters, Commander in Chief, Pacific 
Fleet, Honolulu, Hawaii; and Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force 
Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii. In addition to these interviews, 
a wealth of memoranda and published background material were 
used from a variety of other sources cited in the L i s t  of 
References. 
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S UNITED STATES/JAPAN RESPONSIBILITY SHARING =SUE 11. 
In April 1952, (Ambassador John) Allison outlined tho case 
for going slowly on the issue of Japanese dsfease. In a 
memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, he pointed 
out that Japanese rearmament was as much a political prob- 
lem as a military one, in that "the development and expan- 
sion of Japanese military forces go to the very heart of 
Japan's future and explore the sensitive nerves of Japan's 
political life", (Brands, 1986, p. 392) 
Since 1952, not much has changed in the United States/ 
Japan responsibility sharing, and the debate over Japan's 
rearmament continues. Japan 's Asian neighbors, fearing the 
rise of a militaristic Japan that terrorized them during World 
War 11, object to rearmament. Domestically, polls show an 
anti-military sentixieiit among the Zapanese public: one in ten 
favor further defense boosts and eight in ten disagreed with 
Japanese support of the United States/Japan alliance that 
would mean expanded Japanese defense responsibilities (U.S. 
Information Agency, January 7, 1988, p. 2). Today's debate, 
however, is inextricably tied to economic as well as political 
dimensions of the United States/Japan relations. The economic 
difficulties, such as budget and trade deficits again spurred 
criticism that Japan's "free ride" must end. A sense of 
priorities for the allocation of national resources should be 
the foundation for a rational, long-term posture on 
participatory defense (hereafter in this thesis referred to as 
responsibility sharing) and may result from the current 
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internal debate over federal budget priorities. Many claim 
that the low percentage of the gross national product (GNP) 
spent on defense by Japan accounts for its much higher 
productivity growth rates. The emotional reaction to what 
some interpret as Japan's uncooperative attitude is 
understandable if the protective umbrella of the United States 
has enabled Japan to prosper by having to spend minimally on 
its own defense and mostly on its economy. Therefore, it 
appears reasonable to demand that Japan now reciprocate by 
rearming or contributing more to responsibility sharing with 
the United States. Some critics even argue that Japan should 
assume a greater role in the security of Northeast Asia  
(Kissinger, 1987, p. A25) .  However, while emotions may be 
high i.? America, t h s  prospect of japan doing signizicantiy 
more than it is now performing toward its own defense and for 
the security of the entire region appears low. The evolution 
of Japan's defense forces has been a painful process, and, 
therefore, substantial changes are mot likely to occur soon 
(GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p. 19). 
From t h e  perspective of some in the United States, Japan 
appears arrogant arid ungrateful. From Japan's view, however, 
it is a necessary course o€ actian. At leagt for now, Japan's 
position on defense is a product of carefully balanced 
consensus: military force structure changes are difficult to 
make in Japan. Successive conservatj.ve Japanese governments 
have referred to the  Constitution that renounces war and 
5 
forbids maintaining I lwer  potentialtt as legal grounds for the 
development of a numerically small defense force. The 
Japanese are proud of their economic gains since World War II, 
and they look upon the United States' demands for increased 
Japanese contributions to its defense as driven by the United. 
States' budget problems. These two factors appear to add to 
Japanese reluctance to renegotiate responsibility sharing. 
With due respect to the vitality, sense of purpose, 
industriousness, and discipline characteristic of the Japanese 
people, it is widely recognized in Japan and elsewhere that 
their astounding achievements would not have been possible 
without a national security strategy that has proved both 
effective and cheap. Sheltered against external threats by 
the United States, Japan has enjoyed the enviable position of 
controlling the extent and manner of its political and 
military involvement with the problems and conflicts of other 
nations. The post-World War I1 governments of Japan have 
tended to remain on the sidelines in international security 
affairs, placing their faith in the wisdom of United States 
policy and actions. Since the end of World War 11, thr; burden 
of responsibility and inherent costs of maintaining a safe 
international environment around Japan has rested heavily on 
the United States. 
From today's vantage point, such a division of xespomsi- 
bility sharing benefits may appear unbalanced in favor of 
Japan. Yet it must be recognized that the present arrangement 
6 
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is the logical outcome of Japan's total military defeat in 
World War 11, and also the consequence of subsequent far- 
reaching United States policy decisions to retain for itself 
the leading role in shaping the future of postwar Japan. More 
than four decades have gone by, and it is not surprising that 
the United States/Japan alliance relationship demands 
adjustments. Changes in the domestic conditions of the 
alliance partners, in the correlation of their forces, and in 
the international context in which the United States and Japan 
must pursue their policy objectives should be reconsidered. 
Recognition of this fact appears to have come about more 
slowly in Japan than in the United States. 
Japan faces serious future challenges--in economic, social 
and international forces shaping the future and maintenance of 
its full partnership share in the Japan/United States defense 
a1liance.l With the protection provided by the United States, 
Japan generally has invested less than one percent of its 
gross national product on defense over the years. It has also 
emerged as a front-rank economic power with 2 per capita GNP 
that surpasses the United States. The oil embargo of the 
1970's, however, highlighted Japan's economic vulnerability t o  
'Fortune, 30 March 1987 cited five forces that will shape 
the future of Japan: demands from outsiders f o r  Japan to 
 internationalize" ; discantent with a school system that may 
stifle creativity; the burden of ca r ing  far  the increasing 
number of senior citj.zens: shortage of space: and a blow to 
the national psyche as the ideal of lifetime employment fades 
away . 
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external forces. Accordingly, in order to manage future 
challenges, Japan once again looked to the United States f o r  
help. Under the Japanese Constitution and the Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA) , Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are 
configured only to counter a limited, small-scale threat to 
Japan, Japanls defense policy is oriented toward self-defense 
of Japanese territory; Japan has no other area or regional 
defense commitments, The mission of Japan's SDF is to defend 
the nation, including airspace and waters, against aggression. 
Defensive operations are to be initiated only when Japan is 
attacked by a foreign power, and those operations are to be 
kept to the minimurn required for Japan's self-defense. 
Dispatching armed forces to foreign territories has been 
viewed by the Government of Japan (GOJ) to be inconsistent 
with its passive defense strategy and its constitution. 
Japan's concept of defense capability improvement or buildup 
is based on a strict civilian control system designed to 
prevent Japan from evolving into a military power that might 
threaten neighboring countries. 
Japan's defense strategy is further limited by its "three 
non-nuclear principles." They are considered afPicia1 policy 
and specify that Japan may not possess, produce, or allow the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Although the 
Nakasone Cabinet diC eventually supersede the self-imposed 
8 
one-percent-of-GNP limit on defense', the fundamental 
questions of national security still remain. Should Japan 
further rearm? If so, to what extent? Can Japan still count 
on the United States to defend it against the Soviets or a 
Third-World country? If Japan must rearm, what will be the 
impact on its economy? These are difficult questions that 
Japanese leadership must answer to meet the challenges of the 
future. In addition, the future of tAe United States/Japan 
relationship will be tempered by the quality of commitments, 
agreements and understandings of bilateral economic and 
defense issues. 
At no time since World War I1 has the responsibility 
sharing issue represented a greater danger to United 
States/Japan alliance cohesion than now. In the Uni5ed 
States, the preoccupation with reducing the nation's budget 
and trade deficits and the perception as a declining economic 
power relative: to Europe and Asia are exerting downward 
pressures on defense expenditures. The hope that improved 
East-West relations and arms control agreements will reduce 
military costs adds opposition to a significant increase in 
2Although Japan's annual defense budgets for the last 
decade were limited to one percent of GNP, the expenditures 
showed real growth due to an increase fn GNP each year. 
Notwithstanding pressures from the United States, the real 
growth in Japan's defense budgets were necessary in response 
to changes in the international environment such as the 
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets and the perceived 
decline of U.S. strength in A s i a  after the withdrawal from 
Vietnam. 
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defense spending. This mix of priorities and perceptions has 
rapidly transformed responsibility sharing into a highly 
visible, emotional, political issue. 
According to Gansler, "Steps must be taken to close the 
gap between an unlimited foreign-policy posture and a limited 
set of resources" (Gansler, 1989, p. 66). He lists nine Steps 
as proposals toward accomplishing that goal: 1) Introduce 
greater realism and balance into the planning of the national- 
security mission; 2) Integrate arms-control actions with the 
national-security strategy; 3) Improve the integration of the 
United States defense posture with those of our allies; 4) Get 
our allies to pick up a larger share of the mutual defense 
costs; 5) Reduce the permanent deployments of United States 
forces and shift to a more mobile force structure; 6) Place 
greater reliance on the use of reserve forces and on 
industrial mobilization; 7) Take fax greater advantage of the 
improvements in military capability and in tactics offered by 
advanced technologies; 8) Integrate the planning and the war- 
fighting capabilities of the various armed services; and 9) 
Stress, in the design of conventional weapon systems, the 
importance of increased quantities and ease of operations and 
maintenance. 
In adding greater realism to national-security planning, 
the United States must. answer two questions: What wars are 
planned for? And, how much funding is available f o r  these 
plans? An effective, rational, and consistent foreign policy 
10 
that rr.lates to force structure, weapon selection, and defense 
budgets is essential. The integration of arms control 
(conventional, nuclear, biological, and chemical) in this 
foreign policy would eliminate significant investment 
expenditures for the weapon systems as well as updating 
existing equipment to withstand an attack. To increase 
interoperability, integrated planning with NATO allies on the 
design and distribution of equipment, manpower, and tactics is 
a prime objective. 
Dependence on the allies to form a m i l i t a r y  alliance 
superior to the Soviet Union adds pressure on the United 
States to request more defense expenditures from the allies to 
strengthen the effectiveness of the security posture. If 
these allies assumed a more active role, it could result in a 
reduction of permanent deployment of United States' troops and 
a shift to a more mobile force. Given the assumption that 
there would be signs of a Soviet buildup, reliance on the 
reserves and on industrial mobilization is an option to be 
considered. The United States has the ability to call up the 
reserves faster than they can be equipped due in large part to 
the increased sophistication of the equipment and long lead 
times. However to increase force effectiveness under resource 
constraints, the United States should take advantage of 
advanced technologies that offer new military capabilities and 
improved tactics. To do so, the United States must divest 
itself of traditional institutional barriers in the various 
11 
services. Additionally, the individual services must 
integrate into one synergistic force to include resource 
planning and war-fighting. Doing so will optimize the use of 
defense resources--increased quantities of weapons systems and 
ease of operations, support, and maintenance. 
None of these steps will be easy to accomplish. With 
regards to number 4, the United States is negotiating 
currently with Japan to increase the Japanese defense 
responsibility sharing contributions in several areas, some of 
which would reduce United States' stationing costs. These 
areas j.nclude yen-based stationing costs (salaries for 
Japanese citizens who work at United States bases, and costs 
for utilities and routine maintenance plus contracted ship 
repair costs) , wartime host nation support, and quality-of- 
life initiatives for United States service members serving in 
Japan. United States officials also believe that Japan could 
increase its official development assistance (ODA) to other 
nations, its contributions ta the United Nation's peacekeeping 
operations, and assistance in the cost of the Iraq embargo and 
the related military operations. The Commander of United 
States Forces Japan (USFJ) conducts negotiations on these 
issues with the Defense Agency and other Japanese ministries 
and agencies. In addition, he coordinates with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in regard to the implementation of the 
SOFA. 
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However, with an econaniy focused on producing goods f o r  
the civilian sector and a long post-World War I1 history of 
keeping its defense expenditures under one percent of its GNP, 
Japan tailors its defense approach to the national interest 
and the culture. By the end of 1988, Japan was spending more 
on defense than any other nation in the world except the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Its one percent of GNP is 
the equivalent of $30 billion in United States dollars, which 
is about the same as France, West Germany, and the United 
Kingdom spend on defense. If other expenses such as pensions 
and benefit payments are included in the Japanese responsibil- 
ity sharing computations, their defense expenditures increase 
to $36 billion (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p. 36). As with all of the 
Japanese econc <y, they take a long-term perspective and seek 
long-term budget stability through a five-year plan that is 
relatively stable and is supposed to be reviewed fully only 
every three years. High volume, low cost, and high quality 
are stressed in their defense industrial sector (as En their 
civilian sector) (Gansler, 1989, p. 311). 
Japanese officials believe that a SOFA amendment would be 
necessaryto pay the additional costs under any renegotiation. 
Amendments could pave the way fo r  the Government o€ Japan 
( G O J )  to request ccmplete renegotiation of the SOFA. This 
agreement has been in effect since January 19, 1960. If 
renegotisnation occurs, the United States believes it might 
lose certain advantages enjoyed since that time. Unrestricted 
13 
access to Japan's ports and training areas is the prime target 
of Japanese political opposition parties (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p. 
33). Any change in access would affect United States' 
readiness since there are no other appropriate training 
locations available near Japan. 
Although the SOFA obligates the GOJ to furnish facilities 
and training areas f o r  United States forces, nothing in it 
prohibits the GOJ from paying additional costs. There is a 
provision included in the SOFA (Article XXVII) that allows 
either government to request revision of any article without 
affecting the entire agreement. The Labor Cost Sharing 
Agreement of 1983 is a prime example. If the GOJ were to 
assume the yen-based costs, it would relieve the United States 
government from budgetary pressurss resulting from a drastic 
fall of the dollar. Under such an agreement the GOJ'S 
contribution would increase from 31 percent to 42 percent of 
total stationing costs. Based on projected 1990 salary costs 
for Japanese workers and other yen-based costs paid by USFJ,  
a nine percent increase would equate to approximately $600 
million in United States budgetary savings. 
Support requirements provided by the Japanese under host 
nation support during a contingency would not necessarily 
result in peacetime savings to the United States but would be 
valuable in that the agreement outlines the support required, 
availability, and logistics. The prepositioning of equipment 




transportation assets. In 1982, USFJ and GOJ formed a 
deliberative body that identified 30 projects concerning major 
wartime support for study. The studies include the use of 
Japanese sea, ground, and air transportation assets fo r  
transporting United States personnel, supplies, and material: 
provision of storage facilities for war reserve material; 
support for noncombatant evacuation: in-transit support of 
United States forces; and maintenance of major items of 
equipment in Japan. At this time the studies have not been 
completed (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p. 34). 
To benefit United States service members, USFJ would like 
to see Japan: (a) pay for tolls, road taxes, and inspection 
fees on vehicles of service members stationed in Japan: (b) 
provide discount prices for the r a i l  system and domestic 
flights; and (c) pay security and utility deposits (move-in 
costs) for service members who must live off base. 
In non-defense assistance areas, Japan's Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and contributions to United 
Nations peacekeeping efforts have displaced the United States 
position as the largest world donor of nonmilitary a id .  In 
1989, Japan's foreign aid budget was the equivalent of $11.1 
billion while the United States's was $9.0 billion. Its 
budget for peacekeeping operations was $280 million (GAO/ 
NSIAD, 1989, p .  35) . Japan's contribution to international 
stability and development commensurate with its economic 
stature is encouraged by the United States. Japan's incentive 
15 
to make such contributions is its increased political and 
commercial influence in the recipient nations. Japan would 
like to have its development assistance considered by the 
United States as part of its responsibility sharing. For the 
United States to do so would not increase Japan's overall 
expenditures in relation to GNP by a significant amount. 
Congress has become increasingly concerned over defense 
responsibility sharing as the costs of worldwide United States 
commitments continue to increase while the United States 
economic strength declines as compared to many of its allies. 
The characterization of responsibility sharing as simply 
dollars and cents issue is not always correct. Each ally has 
its own security perceptions based on its unique situation, 
with numeraus intangibles and other objectives also present. 
The voices of pacifism, militarism, nationalism, internation- 
alism, and protectionism continue to influence future Japanese 
responsibility sharing. American negotiators pay close 
attention to the opinion of the Japanese people as consensus 
in Japan's society strongly influences Japan's political 
decisions. This society may allow its SDF to become more 
capable through technology, but a more aggressive (i.e., 
offensive] force as a result of increased. r e s p n n s i h i l i t - ~  
sharing is not likely to be accepted. The "Japan-bashing" 
currently in the United States news, related to the absence of 
significant Japanese backing for the United States military 
J 
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effort against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, is an example of the 
volatility of the  issue of responsibility sharing. 
The next chapter discusses events leading to the current 
responsibility sharing contributions and provides historical 
funding for each category. 
17 
111. AREAS OF RESPON SIBILIT Y SHARING 
This chapter outlines several areas of United States/Japan 
responsibility sharing. For each area, it provides 
information on the background, the current status and 
possibilities for the future. 
A. JAPANESE FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT PR0GRA'- 
The Japanese Facilities Improvement Program ( J F I P )  is the 
most visual of the Japanese responsibility sharing initia- 
tives. It is part of tb? Host Nation Funded Construction 
Program. Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security Between the United States of America and Japan 
granted t h e  United States land, air and naval forces the use 
of Japanese facilities and areas. In addition, it specified 
that "the use of these facilities and areas as well as the 
status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be 
governed by a separate agreement." That follow-on agreement 
is titled the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of 
America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the 
Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (SOFA).  
Article I1 of the SOFA interprets facilities and areas to 
include existing furnishings, equipment and fixtures necessary 
for the operation of those facilities and areas. 
Additionally, it grants either government the ability to 
request a joint review of the established arrangements to 
agree that certain facilities and areas be returned to Japan 
or that additional facilities and areas be provided. Article 
X X V  of the SOFA establishes a Joint Committee o f  the 
Government of Japan and the United States to determine 
specific facilities and areas which are required for the use 
of the United States in carrying out the purposes of the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 
In 1977, the Joint Comittee@s cost-sharing discussions 
and subsequent agreements related to the maintenance of the 
United States forces in Japan led to Japan's initiation of the 
JFIP  in Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 1979.3 A summary of the 
program funding levels since Lts inception is shown in Table 
1 (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Talking Paper, 15BI./JFIP5, 8 
June 1990, p. 21 and GAO/MSIAD, 1989, p. 2 7 ) .  This program is 
designed to fund new construction on United States bases to 
improve the quality of l i fe .  Its primary focus has been 
bachelor and family housing and camunity support facilities, 
less income-producing Non-Appropriated Fund Instrumentalities 
(NAFI). However, recent Japanese budgets have included funds 
for operational support facilities, as hardened aircraft 
3The Japanese fiscal year begins 1 April and is designated 
by the calendar year in which i t  begins, as opposed to the 
U . S .  fiscal year which is designated by the calendar year in 
which it ends. The G O J  budget consists of annual expenditure 
and contract authorization over two U.S. fiscai years. 
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shelters (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p. 2 6 ) .  Through JFY 1988 a total 
of $2.4 billion (220 yen per dollar) in JFIP funds built 5561 
Family Housing units, 409 Bachelor Officer/Enlisted Quarters, 
259 Environmental Facilities, 208 Community Support Facilities 
and 534 Operation/Other Facilities. Another 714 Family 
Housing units were built i.n JFY 1989, and 921 are planned for 
JFY 1990, While there is no specific list f o r  what 
construction projects will be funded, the following are 
general guidelines used by USFJ for determining whether a 
project is appropriate for the program: 
(1) Appropriate fox funding: military family housing; 
comnlunity support facilities; replacement of existing 
facilities due to environmental and/or safety deficien- 
cies; and new mission support facilities. 
(2) Inappropriate fox funding: maintenance or repair of 
United States' facilities: renovation of or addition to 
existing United States' facilities; amnunition storage 
facilities; additional petroleum storage facilities; 
sensitive projects which would require disclosure of 
classified or highly technical data; or the current 
politically controversial (with the local Japanese 
community) facilities. 
The reconstruction program replaces existing projects that 
are in substandard condition. Initiatives to increase the 
scope or size of an old facility are not considered in the 
reconstruction program. Under the terms af the SOFA, the 
United States is required to continually review its holdings 
and return those facilities not required. The GOJ provides 
new facilities and areas to meet United States' requirements 
on a "quid pro quo1' basis, i.e., it will construct replacement 
facilities on a square foot for square foot and function for  
function basis. To keQp design and construction times to a 
minimum and cost predictions accurate, the GOJ has instituted 
a standardized design for types of buildings where this is 
practicable. 
Japan will not fund projects interpreted as increasing the 
United States' capability to conduct offensive operations or 
in support of strategic missions outside of Japan, but w i l l  
accept requirements which support contingencies in Japan. The 
GOJ defers building of these facilities to DoD's Military 
Construction (Milcon) appropriation. In 1988 J F I P  was eight 
percent of worldwide military construction funding (Talking 
Paper, 15Bl/JFIP5, 8 June 31990, p. 18). 
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USF3's current approach to program development is to 
propose a majority of projects with a high probability of 
acceptance and a few projects aimed at challenging the 
constraints oE the program. The GOJ considers the 
sensitivities of the local prefecture and citizenry when 
awarding JFIP  projects. Sapanese law requires a construction 
permit from the local municipality prior to commencing work. 
Perceived adverse environmental impact is generally the reason 
for delayed permits. In an effort to overcome local concerns, 
environmentally related proj ects (e. g . , jet engine noise 
suppressing facilities and relocating the Iwakuni airport for 
night-landing practice by United States ship-borne aircraft) 
have been included in United States requests. Even these 
projects have been met with opposition; e.g., plans to 
relocate the Iwakuni airport to Miyake Island have been 
abandoned due to persistent opposition by the islanders (Stars 
and Stripes, August 21, 1990, p. 3). The GOY had earmarked 
$6.7 milhion for the project since 1987, However, nearly one- 
third of that budget was returned to government coffers since 
little progress had been made. 
Since the JFY is six months out of phase with the United 
States' FY, detailed planning and programming by the United 
States is required 1 1/2 years prior to the Japanese budget. 
Improvements to the quality of life for United States forces 
in Japan have been significant but not without controversy. 
Congress continues to encourage the GOJ to enhance its 
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participation in their national security. On more than one 
occasion, MilCon projects have been dropped from DoD's budget 
because Congress deemed them appropriate for JFIP 
(Skierkowski, 1986, p. 14). The timing difference in the 
fiscal years results in lost projects if those deleted cannot 
be included in USFJ's program proposal. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to the United 
States to using JFIP rather than Milcon. It is typically a 
much faster program. Projects submitted in Spring 199'1 and 
approved by April 1992 can be completed during 1993 or 1994. 
But the rapid pacr?. of the program makes the GOJ relatively 
inflexible in extending deadlines or allowing changes to 
previously submitted proposals. Unlike MilCon, projects do 
not have to compete w i t h  other bases in the Marine C o r p s  for 
prioritization. Therefore, the activity submitting the 
proposal has more flexibility. Even with the restrictions of 
the JFIP, the probability of project acceptance is much 
higher. The Marine Corps project aczeptance exceeds 90 
percent of submissions (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Talking 
Paper, 15Bl /JFIP5 ,  8 June 1990, p.  2). The high acceptance 
rate leads to a decrease in the acceptance of valid MilCsn 
projects. Congress has interpreted the success of JFIP  to 
mean that little MilCon is needed for Japan. Tho successes in 
expanding JFIP  projects in one location do not necessarily 
indicate a change in the Japan-wide JFIP program. The power 
of the local politicians and constituency have a great deal of 
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influence over project approval. The result may be a valid 
mission requirement that goes unfilled since it was rejected 
by both GOJ and Congress. Apparent expansion in the scope of 
JFIP is  subject to considerable bureaucratic interpretation by 
the GOJ and not necessarily written or verbal policy changes. 
The United States can receive mixed signals on the limits of 
JFIP when a facility in a locality is approved and the 
following year a like facility in a different locality is 
disapproved. Interpretations of the J F I P  coupled with the 
mood sf the local perfecture may change from year to year and 
Congress should not view them as Itset in concrete. 'I Misunder- 
standings have led to project delays because the projects Rave 
been dropped from MilCon or JFIP. Projects that previously 
would definitely have been inappropriate for JFIP were 
submitted for MilCon and now have been dropped from MilCon 
because of apparent expansion of J F I P .  A summary of recent 
program funding levels is provided in Table 2 (Fleet Marine 
Force, Pacific Talking Paper, 15Bl/JFIP5, 8 June 1990, p. 30). 
Service levels of JFIP funding arc? fairly consistent year 
after year: Anny--l2 percent, USMC--28 percent, Navy--30 
percent, and USAF-30 percent. 
Ancillary funds provided by the United States to support 
the JFIP projects include MilCon, Operation and Maintenance, 
Marine Corps (O&N,MC) , and Commissary Trust Fund agprcapria- 
t ions .  The MilCon appropriation offsets United States' 
desisn, construction surveillance, inspection and overhead 
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TABLE 2 
RECENT PROGRAM FUNDING InEVELS 
(in millions) 
a U.S. FORC ES TOTJ& USMC TOT& * 
a9 416 66 
90 458 77 
9 1  470 87 
92 500 78** 
* military family housing on Okinawa, managed and programmed 
by the USAF not included 
** the decrease from JFY 91 to JFY 92 reflects discontinuance 
of a special additional. augmentation of $10 million 
designated for the construction of Bachelor Enlisted 
Quarters (BEQ's) 
costs  required to manage the host nation construction program. 
O&M,MC purchases and installs collateral equipment for the 
occupants of the facilities'. The Commissary T r u s t  Fund 
purchases collateral equipment fo r  a commissary store. 
USFJ expects the following for JFIP  Ounding between JFY's 
1990 and 2000: GOJ initiatives and Community Support 
facilities to remain consistent at $30 million and $45 
million, respectively, per year through JFY 2000; Family 
Housing unit construction will be complete in JFY 1998; 
Bachelor Enlisted/Of f icer Quarters complete in JFY 1996 ; 
Operation/Other construction w i l l  absorb the funding for 
4Collateral equipment may include off ice furnishings, 
communications equipment to meet U.S. specifications, and 
unique security devices, such as vaults for classified 
material. 
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BEQ/BOQ and Family Housing units through JFY 1999: and total 
funding through JFY 1999 will be approximately $460 million. 
J F I P  is fundamental to improving and maintaining the 
facilities infrastructure for the United States forces in 
Japan. USFJ continues to be sensitive to the program 
constraints, finetunes its requirements to the real-time 
political and technical situations, and plans accurately as 
far in advance as possible to maintain program momentum. 
B. LABOR COST SHARING (LCS) 
Article I11 of the SOFA specifies that the United States 
will take all measures necessary to operate, safeguard, and 
control the facilities and areas it uses in Japan. Initially, 
this was interpreted by the GOJ to include all pay and 
allowances for Japanese nationals hired in support of the 
United States government. The eight basic allowances and a 
brief description of each follows: family--employees with 
dependents are paid additional amounts for each dependent; 
adjustment-for employees that reside in areas designated as 
high cost which can be up to ten percent of basic wage; 
commutation--depends on the distance an employee travels to 
work as well as the mode of transportation used; housing-- 
comparable to the military Bachelor Allowance for Quarters 
( B A Q ) ,  it pays a portion of the employee's mortgage/rent/ 
lease; summer, year-end, and term-end--collectively the three 
are considered seasonal bonuses that an employee qualifies for 
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by working a specific numbers of days per year, the maximum 
amount allowable is 5.25 months of base pay, adjustment 
allowanceo fixed allowance and family allowance; and 
retirement--a lump sum payment provided at retirement, 
resignation, or reduction-in-force (RIF), mandatory retirement 
is at age 60, the lump sum amount is determined by the 
employee's pay rate, length of service, and type of 
termination. A Japanese employee's pay consists of 42.9 
percent base pay, 39.9 percent allowances, 8.0 percent social 
insurance, 4.9 percent miscellaneous, and 4.3 percent USFJ 
differential (discussed la ter) .  
Because conditions affecting employees in Japan are 
influenced by local customs, practices, and laws, administra- 
tion of the workforce is complex and unique. To reduce such 
complexity, USFJ has entered into an indirect-hire agreement 
under which the G W  serves as the legal or go-between 
employer. Wages and employment conditions under this 
agreement are negotiated between USFJ and GOJ. Base pay and 
allowance payments are made in yen by the GOJ, and the United 
States government "reimburses" the GQJ monthix according to 
the current rate of exchange. United States Public Law 86-223 
provides that compensation plans for local national employees 
be based on prevailing wage rates and compensation practices 
in the locality. After Warld War 11, these employees were 
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paid in excess of the prevailing wage rates.' This higher 
wage rate, known as the USFJ differential, was ten percent 
higher than the basic wage and provided incentive to work in 
support of the government that had j u s t  ended Japanese 
military might. This practice has been retained and enlarged 
by subsequent pay raises. 
In the early 19701s, the Japanese economy began an upward 
trend, commodity prices soared, and the international economic 
condition fluctuated (the value of the dollar fell from 360 to 
260 yen) (Kelley, 1988, p. 8). In addition, Japanese wage 
rates began to increase at a rate higher than the normal cost- 
of-living pay raises. In 1974 alone the increase was 
approximately 30 percent. Table 3 provides a breakdown of the 
wage increases incurred since 1970. Each year the United 
States government attempted to negotiate a lower-than- 
prevailing-wage-rate increase to offset the higher wages paid 
since the end of World War 11. A t  the same time, requirements 
for the size of the workforce were reduced. Neither of these 
situations is a common occurrence in Japanese government or 
major industries, and the resulting strikes prompted labor 
cost-sharing discussions and negotiations between the GOJ and 
the United States government. 
'Prevailing wage rates for the Japanese hired by the 
Japanese government and indirectly paid by the U.S. government 
are in the same proportion as the GOY National Public Service 
(NPS) employees. This is in accordance with CINCPAC Instruc- 
tion 12260.3B and USFJ Manual 40-1. 
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In accordance w i t h  the SOFA, a Joint Committee was formed 
to ratify the labor cost-sharing discussions. The agreement’ 
signed i)rL December 1977 became effective JFY 1977 and was to 
‘To date there have been three Labor Cost Sharing 
Each of them is known by the number of the round, agreements. 
e.g., First-Round, S?cond-Round, and Third-Round. 
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last indefinitely. The purpose of LCS was, and continues to 
be, to protect Japanese jobs, thereby contributing to the 
Japanese national policy of full employment and economic 
security (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Point Paper, BPoint2, 
1988, p. 1). bnder the First-Round Agreement, the GOJ agreed 
to share allowance items considered welfare and recreation 
expenses absent from the National Personnel Service (NPS) 
employees wage system (Defense of Japan, 1989, p. 188). 
Assumption of these llindirecttl abor costs was a way around 
the GOJ'S interpretation of Article XXIV of the SOFA, which it 
had construed to prohibit payment of "direct" USFJ labor 
costs. The GOJ assumed the following allowance items: social 
insurance (employerIs share), health and medical expenses, 
uniforms and protective clothing, recreation expenses, 
calamity benefits, incentive awards, and administrative fees. 
The First-Round Agreement amounted to approximately 6 * 5  
percent of the total wage and allowance cost (Hall, 1990, p. 
1)- The United States government agreed within the following 
year to open discussions on the Japanese labor law and 
contracting out and to provide a three-year labor forecast. 
This cost sharing agreement set a precedent for further cost 
sharing of facilities construction as well as labor. 
The following year another Joint Committee was formed to 
negotiate a second LCS agreement. The Second-Round Agreement, 
signed in December 1978, became effective JFY 19'79 and was to 
last indefinitely. The items the GOJ agreed to assume 
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amounted to another 6.5 percent. The items included the 
language allowance, USFJ differential, and a portion of the 
retirement allowance, but exluded Okinawa. The United States 
government agreed to pay the housing allowance, increase the 
night-shift differential, and continue discussion of the three 
issues agreed to in the First-Round Agreement. 
The GOJ’S total share of labor costs after the second 
agreement was approximately 13 percent. As the social 
insurance percentage of basic pay was increased by the GOJ and 
the amount of incentive awards paid increased, the total share 
rose to 15 percent. Since Japan considered the First- and 
Second-Round agreements to be within the existing SOFA 
provisions, the agreements did not require ratification by the 
Japanese Diet. Between 1979 and 1987 there were no further 
Joint Committee agreements on LCS. A6 discussed previously 
the JFIP was initiated in 1979 because the Japanese did not 
believe that an increase in labor cost sharing was politically 
feasible due to public opinion. However, in 1980, 1981, 1982, 
and 1984 the United Sttltes government suggested that Japan 
increase its LCS (Kelley, 1988, p. 9). There was no leverage 
provided by work force rechiz’*ions or high wage increases to 
force the issue during this period, so Japan declined. But in 
1986, when the dollar fell rapidly against the yen, and in 
1987 when United States oil supplies were threatened during 
the Persian Gulf crisis, the United States stance requesting 
more Japanese assistance became stronger. Japan alsa relied 
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on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region but, because of 
its Peace Constitution, could not join the United States in 
sending maritime forces there. Congressional pressure to 
increase allied assistance from Japan mounted, well-publicized 
by a letter from Senator Robert C. Byrd to President Reagan. 
It was suggested that Japan assume all yen-based costs, such 
as base pay for Japanese workers, utilities, and ship repairs. 
Japan declined, stating that this would require a renegotia- 
tion of the SOFA which neither Japan nor the United States 
desired. A s  discussed previously, the United States believed 
it might lose certain advantages enjoyed under the current 
SOFA such as unrestricted access to Japan's ports and trainling 
areas. The pro-American faction of the GOJ does not desire 
any loss of USFJ defensive support in the event the SOFA was 
renegotiated to cause such a loss. This led to a Third-Round 
Agreement between Ambassador Mansfield and the Japanese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yuko Kurihara. Negotiated 
outside the SOFA provisions (specifically Article XXIV) and 
known as a Special Measure, it was ratified as a new treaty by 
the Di& in June 1987, effective 1 June 1987 to 31 March 1992 
(through JFY 1991) (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p. 25). The United 
states government treated it as an administrative agreement 
not requiring congressional approval. The GOJ agreed to 
assume up to 50 percent of the United States government costs 
of family, commutation, adjustment, housing, seasonal, and 
retirement allowances. Mandatory retirements caused by RXF's 
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were excluded. This amount.ed to 42 percent of total labor 
costs. The Third-Round Agreement was amended in March 1988 to 
permit the GOY to pay all or any part of the eight basic 
allowances. 
The significant transition upward from 5 0  percent to 100 
percent was accomplished over a period of several fiscal 
years. The GOJ budget for JFY 1987 funded the  allowances at 
50 percent for part of the fiscal year; for JFY 1988 
allowances were funded at 50 percent fo r  the entire fiscal 
year; for JFY 1989, 75 percent; and f o r  JFY 1990 (the current 
fiscal year), 100 percent, Although it has not been approved 
by the Diet, the GOJ budget for JFY 1991 funds the allowances 
at 100 percent. The 100 percent funding currently amounts to 
54.2 percexit of the total labor costs (Hall, 1990, p. 2). 
After the First-Round Agreement in JFY 1978, the GOJ paid 
6.2 billion yen, or $31 million U . S .  dollars. By JFY 1989 the 
amount had increased to $409 million or 53.2 billion yen. A 
synopsis of the trend of Japanese support i n  labor cost 
sharing since 1981 is provided in Table 4 (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p. 
26). 
As of May 1989, the Japanese workforce of 22,463 by United 
States service it supported was: 11,454 (53. percent) for the 
Navy/Marines; 7213 (32 percent) for the Air Force; and 3796 
(17 percent) for the Army. Approximately 65 percent of t h e  
workforce were employed on mainland Japan, while 35 percent 
were employed on Okinawa.. 
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TABLE 4 
UBOR COST SHARING CONTRIBUTIONS 

































The LCS initiative for future years not covered by the 
Third-Round Agreement will become more impartant after the JFY 
1991budget is approved. The United States will negotiate for 
further increases in labor cost-sharing. The USFJ goal is 
that the GOJ fund 100 percent of pay and allowances. However, 
the USFJ does not desire to relinquish any management control 
uf the Japanese employees. The GOJ has as its goals: no 
RIF's fox fiscal reasons; consultations in advance of 
decisions adversely impacting on the work force; and work 
force stability. 
Currently, the Japanese Diet's interpretation of the SOFA 
means that the United States will always pay certain expenses, 
to include base pay for Japanese employed to maintain United 
States forces in Japan. T h i s  interpretation does not prevent 
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the Japanese from subsidizing base pay however. Japan's final 
hurdle to begin base pay subsidization is a legal one. The 
Japanese interpretation of the SOFA will not allow them to 
fund base pay. 
C. RELOCATION CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 
When Japan takes land occupied by the Un!. ted  States 
forces, it constructs new facilities for these forces 
elsewhere. This relocation construction program, a 
predecessor to JFIP, began in 1965. Most of the relocation 
projects agreed to bj Japan and the United States are near 
completion. A n y  new construction, whether f o r  relocation as 
desired by the Japanese, or due to United States' forces 
requirements, is funded by JFIP. The mounts required for 
relocation are decreasing as shown in Table 5 (Shiamori, 1990, 
P.1) 
D. BASE COUNTERMEASURES AND COST OF PRIVATE LAND 
Projects to improve the local environment surrounding 
United States bases are known as base countermeasures. 
Examples include noise suppressors, flight path and time 
restrictions, dwelling relocation, disaster prevention, and 
environmental improvements. Such countermeasures contribute 
to mutual defense efforts by building local support for United 
States presence at the bases (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p. 24). 
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The GOJ pays for renting arnd leas ing  of privately owned 
property for United States’ military use. It then provides 
this land free of charge to the United States. This land 
amounts to 42,847 acres, 52 percent of the total land provided 
for United States’ use for military bases. The remaining 48 
percent, 39,221 acres, is owned by the GOJ and is discussed in 
a subsequent section of t h i s  thesis. 
Both countermeasures and costs of private land axe paid by 
the GOJ in yen. Table 6 illustrates the effect that exchange 
rates have on Japan’s contribution to United States’ station- 
ing costs (GAO,”SIAD, 1989, p. 24). The actual increase from 
1981 to 1987 was five percent if the contributions are 
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TABLE 6 
JAPAN'S LAND AND BASE COUNTERMEASURES CONTRIBUTIONS 
JAPANESE DOLLARS YEN EXCHANGE RATE' 
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calculated only in yen. However, converting yen to U.S. 
dollars (nominal) resulted in an increase of 73 percent. 
E. FOREGONE REXENUES AND OTHER COMPENSATION 
In addition to the direct support items detailed above, 
Japan considers foregone revenues as part of its support for 
United States' forces in Japan. Foregone revenues include 
exempted tolls, taxes, and land rents, i . e . ,  charges that USFJ 
does not have to pay to Japan. 
The United States is exempt from taxes on petroleum 
products supplied from Japanese refineries, and from supplies 
and equipment purchased from the local economy. Customs 
duties on o f f i c i a l  imports, and highway tolls on official 
'Average annual rate supplied by USFJ. 
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travel  are also exempt. In 1389 Japan estimated the rental 
value of GOY-owned l a d  Frovided free to United States' forces 
a t  54 b i l l i o n  yen ($415  m i l l i o n ) .  
Other costs in this category include compensation ta 
Japanese engaged i n  agriculture,  forestry, f i shery ,  etc. when 
t h e i r  business operations are adversely a f f ec ted  by USFJ 
a c t i v i t i e s ,  e.g., a i r c r a f t  take-offs and landings or landing 
amphibious veh ic l e s .  A l s o  included are SOFA A r t i c l e  XVIII 
claims and other Defense F a c i l i t i e s  Administration Agency 
costs. 
F .  CONCLUSIONS 
A summary of the  t o t a l  host  nation support costs incurred 
or foregone by the GOJ s i n c e  1979 is provided in Table 7 
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This chapter provides program descriptions and funding 
levels €or five areas of Japanese responsibility sharing: 
Japanese Facilities Improvement Program; Labor Cost Sharing; 
Relocation Construction Program; Base Countermeasures and Cost 
of Private Land; and Foregone Revenues and Other Compensation. 
Chanter IV of this thesis provides an analysis of the future 
direction OP United States/Japan responsibility sharing. The 
Persian Gulf crisis has surfaced some significant new issues 
in defense responsibility sharing. The options and 
constraints far using Japanese forces in the multilateral 
BThese amounts should be considered the total the United 
States government is saving as a r e s u l t  of responsibility 
sharing with the GOJ. 
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Persian Gulf Iraq embargo effort also is addressed in Chapter 
IV . 
4 0  
NG FOR THE FUT URE DIRECTION OF RE SPONSTBILITY SHARI IV. 
This chapter provides an analysis of the short- and leng- 
term future of United States/Japanese responsibility sharing 
in the five areas indicated in previous chapters. This 
discussion does not presume knowledge of current negotiations, 
their priorities, or their political implications. It is an 
effort to speculate on the impact of increases and/or 
decreases to current responsibility sharing positions and to 
focus specifically on the impact of change for the United 
States Marine Corps. It is the authoE"s opinion that the 
United States will not accept Japanese decreases in any area 
of responsibility sharing. Obtaining high quality information 
on the current state of negotiation is difficult as these 
deliberations are classified and sensitive. More information 
will be available sometime in 1991. 
A. JAPANESE FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM 
Current spending levels of $87 million to support the 
Marine Corps may not continue in the future. The island of 
Japan is limited in the amount of area remaining upon which to 
build. In addition, the remaining area is highly valued by 
the local prefecture and residents. Local pressure against 
granting construction permits, for environmental and other 
reasons, has halted construction. 
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The FY 1989 U . S .  Defense Appropriation A c t  placed a troop 
strength ceiling on the number of service members assigned to 
permanent duty ashore in Northeast Asia. This Northeast Asia  
Troop Strength (NEATS) ceiling specifies that the number of 
active duty military assigned to Korea and Japan must not 
exceed 94,450 on September 30, 1990 and thereafter. To 
reflect the Marine portion of that ceiling, the Military 
Personnel, Marine Corps (MPMC) Office of Secretary of Defense 
Budget, Fiscal Year 1992/1993 currently exhibits the following 
end strengths for Japan: FY 1990--24,483; FY 1991--25,844; FY 
1992--23,420; and FY 1993--22,495. The end-strength reduction 
of 1988 from FY I990 to FY 1993 provides evidence to the GOJ 
that the possibility exists  fo r  some currently used buildings 
to become unoccupied. These buildings include not  only 
administrative and maintenance facilities but the family 
housing structures. Of€-base Japanese landlords currently 
have empty rental housing and therefore are against building 
additional family housing regardless of the end strength 
projections . 
The drawdown of Marines would result in the return of 
buildings to the Japanese ad Marines consolidate remaining 
forces. Conversion of administrative, family housing, or 
family support structures to Japanese use will not be 
difficult. But, alteration of maintenance facilities 
specially built to accommodate U . S .  Marine-unique equipment 
may present some difficulties. It will be diPficult to 
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convince the GOJ to again build similar facilities in areas 
where Marines have moved. 
Classified earlier as inappropriate to fund with the 
Facilities Improvement Program, maintenance and repair of U.S. 
facilities may become another vehicle for the Japanese to show 
their support. Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps (O&M, 
MC) provides funding for the category of support. With the 
reduction in personnel, it may be expectEd that the level of 
OtM, MC support will be decreased. Additional pressure w i l l  
be placed on the GOJ to assume maintenance and repair of 
facilities to allow the Marines to maintain their offensive 
capabilities. 
B. LABOR COST SHARING 
Assuming Japanese payment of a portion of base pay, and 
continuing the full payment of the allowances of the Japanese 
nationals hired in support of the  United States government, 
this would serve as a tangible demonstration that the GOJ 
fully supports the presence of the American military. To do 
so, the GOJ will need to reevaluate its interpretation of the 
SOFA. Currently, the GOJ believes Article X X I V  of the SOFA 
prohibits it from paying direct labor costs. Basic salary is 
identified as a direct cost. Base pay is another yen-based 
cost that can be funded by realignment of funds from other 
categories if the rate of exchange is higher than that 
budgeted. 
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Initially, a small percentage of the base pay will be 
assumed by the GOJ with the percentage increasing in the 
future. Assumption of 100 percent of base pay and allowances 
on a permanent basis without the United States' government 
relinquishing any of its management control is the ultimate 
United States goal. 
C. RELOCATION CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 
Although relocation of the Marines by the GOJ will not 
occur, the consolidation mentioned earlier in this chapter may 
result in increased spending in this program. It is possible 
that the Japanese public would be more amenable to increased 
expenditures in this program since it could be interpreted 
that the GOJ was the impetus for the United States' forces 
relocation. 
B. BASE COUNTERMEASURES AND COST OF PRIVATE LAND 
Consolidation of Marine forces in specific areas will 
increase the need for noise suppression, disaster prevention, 
and environmental improvements at those locations. The same 
situation will occur here as has occurred in t h e  Facilities 
Improvement Program. The requirement for like accommodations 
in the new location will be present and may be more urgent 
with a higher concentration of forces. 
The 60J will be able to relinquish land no longer used by 
the Marines to Japanese owners. The fair rental value of 
these lands no longer paid to private owners will result in 
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some savings to the GOY. However, the economic impact to the 
private owners is an unknown. It is possible that they will 
be able to sell it to real estate developers. This may 
alleviate cramped Japanese housing conditions and increase the 
possibility of Japanese home ownership (San Jose Mercurv News I 
November 11, 1990, p. A25) .  
E. FOREGONE REVENUES AND OTHER COMPENSATION 
The amount of supplies and equipment purchased from the 
local economy will decrease with the drawdown of Marines from 
Japan. Foregone revenues for customs duties on official 
imports, and for highway tolls on official travel will also 
decrease. Any GOJ-owned land provided free to Marine forces 
no longer occupied after consolidation will become available 
for other uses. Compensation paid to Japanese engaged in 
agriculture, forestry, fishery, etc., may decrease in the 
areas that Marines vacate but may increase in the consolidated 
areas. 
Other issues 90 not currently fit into the above five 
categories for which the United States could feasibly request 
monetary assistance from the GOJ. A greater share could be 
requested to support the O&M,MC costs to operate and maintain 
the bases and stations and to assist in the support o f  Marines 
and their dependents. Morale, welfare, and recreation funds 
to support community enhancements are being reduced by the 
United States, which may further the U.S. troop isolation from 
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the Japanese community. The presence of Marine dependents 
stabilizes the United States' force and improves morale while 
benefitting the Japanese communities at the same time. 
If the GOJ assumed a greater share of insect/pest control, 
utility cobts, beautification/environmental improvements to 
the bases, and engineering support, the Marine funding used 
for those areas could be reallocated. Utilities are a yen- 
based cost. Dependent on the current exchange rate, utility 
payments will continue to drain funds normally set aside for 
maintenance and repair, training and exercises, and 
sustainability. Greater Japanese contribution to community 
support programs to subsidize cultural events, provide 
discount tickets OF vouchers for travel to cultural centers, 
or provide space and facilities for community parks and 
recreation centers near United States bases and stations would 
enhance Japanese-American family interaction. 
The difference between the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) 
paid to Marines stationed in Japan and the cost to maintain a 
houszhold in the United States also could be born by the G O J .  
Entitlements for dependent travel to stateside colleges or for 
annual leave or emergency travel to the United States for 
Marines or their dependants might be paid by the Japanese. 
These costs are currently born by the Permanent Change o f  
Station budget activity in the MPMC budget. This budget 
consists of over 65 yrcent of total obligation authority fcr 
the Marine C o r p s .  The Japanese contribution to this area 
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could allaw reallocation of funds to other priorities for the 
Marines. To further reduce out-of-pocket expenses borne by 
Marines stationed in Japan on accompaniedtours, the GOJ could 
provide relief from the highway taxes presently levied on 
privately-owned-vehicles. 
The unique laws of the GOJ governing the transportation of 
heavy equipment, weapons, a113 aminunition for @xercises are 
restrictive and expensive. Ia order to maintain combat 
readiness in an ever-declining budget atmosphere, the GOJ 
could bear the transportation costs  to and from training 
areas, to and from points of embarkation and debarkation, and 
costs associated with special handling, packing, packaging, 
and preservation, 
Although questionable due to implications for United 
States forces to be regarded as mercenaries, the GOJ could 
assume part or all of the Marine forces pay and allowances. 
While this option might seem distant at the present time, it 
may be potentially attractive to t h e  United States Congress. 
The responsibility sharing options presented here are 
likely to be addressed, if not in the present negotiations 
then in future ones between the United States and Japan. 
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It remains in the best interest of the United States to 
maintain a forward deployed forces strategy, continuing its 
deterrence posture for Japan. Changes in the regional 
security environment,, combined with evolving United States and 
Japanese domestic political competition will continue to 
buffet the United States/Japan bilateral responsibility 
sharing relationship. Political factions in Japan challenge 
the need for and merits of the United StateslJapan security 
alliance. The United States trade deficit and federal budget 
stress will remain as problems that stimulate requests for 
Japan to ihcrea.se its United States forces’ support 
contribution. There will be greater pressures in Congress to 
reduce the amount of money American taxpayers spend an 
defense. *8Well-to-dovt allies, such as Japan, will be expected 
to pick up a larger portion of the tab. The concern over 
renewed Japanese militarism may not be enough to prevent a 
gradual buildup of Japanese Defense Forces as the United 
States Marines and other United States defense forces begin to 
draw down their Japanese presence as a result of United States 
defense budgetary cuts. 
The answer to the question of benefit from the United 
States presence in Japan is that both countries benefit. The 
answer to whether each country is contributing its fair share 
is not as easy to address. Comparisons are based on data 
provided by each country, each with its own budgetary, 
financial, and tax systems. Additional problems are created 
by fluctuations in exchange rates and accuracy of inflation 
indicators. However, those who are not appreciative of the 
complexities involved in United States/Japan defense relations 
use the following statistics to support the concept of the 
Japanese "free ride." Japan's economy of $9134 billion is 
second only to the United States of $10,141 billion (Report on 
Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, April 1990, p. 
B / 8 ) .  The belief that American taxpayers are shouldering a 
disproportionately high percentage of the cost of maintaining 
security in Japan is based upon comparison of per capita 
expenditares of $1190 psr American vice $236 per Japanese. 
Japan ranks 12th out of 16 countries in per capita defense 
spending (Report on Allied Contributions to the Camon 
Defense, April 1990, p. A./40). Japanls current five-year 
defense plan (1986-1990) was fully funded but it only 
allocated one percant of its GNP for defense. In November, 
1990, after nearly a month of rebuffing the United States' 
request for greater Japanese participation in current Mideast 
operations, the Japanese announced a limited support package. 
Of the four areas of assistance requested (economic help to 
Mideast countries, help in seali€t and airlift of American 
troops and materials, financial. assistance for the U.S. 
military forces, and some form of naval presence in the 
Persian Gulf), Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu offered $1 billion 
to multinational forces, two civilian aircraft and two ships 
for the transportation effort. Polls taken a week after the 
support announcement showed that 59 percent supported the 
government's financial aid but between 73 and 83 percent 
opposed dispatching Japanese SDF to the Persian Gulf. The GOJ 
anticipated Japanese public reaction and took into 
Consideration the l ike l ihood  that victims of Japanese wartime 
aggression would feel uncomfortable when it announced its 
intention. Japan subsequently offered a 100-member medical 
team to be sent to Saudi Arabia to provide humanitarian 
assistance and increased its financial commitment to a totall 
of $4 billion. Of this $4 billion, $2 billion will go to the 
multinational force and $2 billion to the countries suffering 
the most severe economic impact (50s Ancfeles Times, September 
19, 1990, p. Al). Part of the $2 billion support to the 
multinational forces includes items to help support morale and 
welfare in addition to military equipment. (See Table 8, 
United States Commander in Chief Central Command message 
P2208302 Oct 1990). Prime Minister Kaifu recently yielded to 
anti-military sentiment in Japan by discontinuing h i s  effort 
to pass a bill that would have authorized deployment of 
Japanese troops to the Mideast @an Jose Mercurv N e w s ,  
November 8 ,  1990, p. A 3 ) .  
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While Japanese and otLier financial aid to Persian Gulf 
efforts is welcomed by the United States as well as the United 
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Gulf pledge will present a barrier to any further increases in 
responsibility sharing for the United States forces currently 
in Japan. Will the Japanese people allow further increases in 
host nation support in addition to contribution to this recent 
international crisis? 
Adding to difficulties in negotiations for  the United 
States is the institutional memory the Japanese have regarding 
previous United States promises while the United States is 
confronted with a high turnover of personnel. The Japanese 
are able to slow down the process and keep the U.S. off guard 
by bringing up issues the U . S .  is unprepared to discuss. The 
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Japanese can thereby delay decisions that are politically 
unsatisfactory to them. 
As the United States looks to the future of its responsi- 
bility sharing relationship with Japan, it is clear that the 
best approach will require a combination of patience, psrser- 
verance, and innovation in order to adjust to regional and 
global changes while preserving the U.S. presence in Japan. 
Japan's willingness to assume a greater financial support role 
is critical if this process is to continue. The U . S .  
bilateral relationship with Japan is of tremendous economic 
and political importance to both nations. Maintaining a 
substeiitial presence in Japan f o r  the geographically strategic 
location of United States bases, and consequent cost effec- 
tiveness is of primary importance. Although the U.S. expects 
the risk of military confrontation between superpowers to 
diminish as the turn of the century approaches, its presence 
in Japan as a balancing force in Asia is viewed to be 
essential. Forward deployed forces in Japan constitute less 
than s i x  percent of total U.S. forces, a relatively small 
investment for a rapid and flexible response capability in 
strategically important part of the world. 
Responsibility sharing with Japan must be viewed in terms 
of national goals and strategies. It allows the United States 
to preserve its own as well as Japanese independence, 
integrity, freedom, and economic stability. 
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